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LEGISLATIVE NOTE

OHIO'S NEW LIVING WILL STATUTE: WILL IT
SURVIVE?
I.

INTRODUCTION

When the 119th Ohio General Assembly enacted Amended Substitute Senate Bill 1 (Am. Sub. S.B. 1)1 on October 10, 1991, it joined
a majority of other jurisdictions that have implemented living will legislation. 2 While doing so, the Ohio Legislature additionally modified its

1. The general purpose of S.B. 1 was to amend sections 1337.11-.17 and 2101.24 and to
enact sections 2133.01-.15 of the Ohio Revised Code in order to modify provisions of the Durable
Power of Attorney for Health Care Law, to adopt a modified version of the Uniform Rights of the
Terminally Ill Act, and to clarify the legislative intent underlying S.B. 13 (Ohio's 1989 Durable
Power of Attorney for Health Care Law) of the 118th Ohio General Assembly.
2. Including Ohio's new living will bill, forty-five states and the District of Columbia have
incorporated living will or natural death legislation into their health care laws. See ALA. CODE §§
22-8A-1 to 22-8A-10 (1990) (Alabama Natural Death Act of 1981); ALASKA STAT. §§
18.12.010-.100 (1986) (Alaska Rights of Terminally Ill Act of 1986); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
36-3201 to 36-3210 (Supp. 1990) (Arizona Medical Treatment Decision Act of 1985); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to 20-17-218 (Michie Supp. 1987) (Arkansas Rights of the Terminally
Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act of 1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195
(West Supp. 1989) (California Natural Death Act of 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to
15-18-113 (Supp. 1988) (Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act of 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 19a-570 to 19a-575 (West Supp. 1990) (Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems
Act of 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983) (Delaware Death with Dignity Act
of 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to 6-2430 (Supp. 1989) (District of Columbia Natural
Death Act of 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.01-.17 (West Supp. 1990) (Florida Life-Prolonging
Procedure Act of 1984); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to 31-32-12 (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1988)
(Georgia Living Wills Act of 1984, 1986, 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to 327D-27 (Supp.
1988) (Hawaii Medical Treatment Decisions Act of 1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4502 to 3945-09
(Supp. 1990) (Idaho Natural Death Act of 1977, 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 100 /2, para. 701710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990) (Illinois Living Will Act of 1984); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1
to 16-8-11-22 (Burns Supp. 1988) (Indiana Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act of
1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1-.11 (West 1989) (Iowa Life-Sustaining Procedures Act of
1985, 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to 65-28,109 (1985 & Supp. 1989) (Kansas Natural
Death Act of 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.622-644 (Baldwin Supp. 1990) (Kentucky
Living Will Act of 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1989) (Louisiana Life-Sustaining Procedures Act of 1984, 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A §§ 5-701 to 5714 (West Supp. 1990) (The Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act) (Supplemented by In re
Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987)), which held that the right to refuse the administration of
artificial nutrition and hydration is protected by common law, despite the statute); MD. HEALTH-
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newly existing Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care law (HCDPA), 3 thus creating a more uniform body of statutory law governing
health care decisions made by patients or their surrogate
decisionmakers.'

GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to 5-614 (Supp. 1990) (Maryland Life-Sustaining Procedures Act of
1985, 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.01-.17 (West Supp. 1991) (Minnesota Adult Health
Care Decisions Act of 1989); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to 41-41-121 (Supp. 1988) (Missis-

sippi Withdrawal of Life-Saving Mechanisms Act of 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055
(Vernon Supp. 1991) (Missouri Life Support Declarations Act of 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§
50-9-01 to 50-9-206 (1989) (Montana Living Will Act of 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
449.540-.690 (Michie 1987) (Nevada Withholding or Withdrawing of Life-Sustaining Procedures
Act of 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to 137-H:10 (1990) (New Hampshire Terminal
Care Document Act of 1985); S. 1211 (New Jersey Advanced Directive For Health Care Act,
signed July 11, 1991) (not codified); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to 24-7-11 (Michie Supp. 1988)
(New Mexico Right to Die Act of 1977, 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to 90-323 (1990)
(North Carolina Right to Natural Death Act of 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
23-06.4-01 to 23-06.4-14 (Supp. 1989) (North Dakota Uniform Rights of Terminally Ill Act);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West Supp. 1991) (Oklahoma Natural Death Act of
1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.605-127.650 (1989) (Oregon Rights With Respect to Terminal
Illness Act of 1977) (renumbered); R.1. GEN. LAWS 23-4.11.1 -. 13 (1991) (HB 5924-4A) (Rhode
Island Rights of the Terminally I11Act June 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to 44-77-160
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988) (South Carolina Death With Dignity Act of 1986); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 43-12D-12-22 (1991 Supp.) (South Dakota Living Will Act); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 32-11-101 to 32-11-110 (Supp. 1988) (Tennessee Right to Natural Death Act of 1985); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h §§ 1-11 (West Supp. 1989) (Texas Natural Death Act of 1977,
1979, 1983, 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to 75-2-1118 (Supp. 1989) (Utah Personal
Choice and Living Will Act of 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (Supp. 1988) (Vermont Terminal Care Document Act of 1982); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to 54.1-2992 (Michie
1988 & Supp. 1990) (Virginia Natural Death Act of 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
70.122.010-.905 (West Supp. 1989) (Washington Natural Death Act of 1979); W. VA. CODE §§
16-30-1 to 16-30-10 (Supp. 1987) (West Virginia Natural Death Act of 1984); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 154.01-.15 (West Supp. 1989) (Wisconsin Natural Death Act of 1984, 1986); WYO. STAT. §§
35-22-101 to 35-22-108 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (Wyoming Act of 1984); see also SOCIETY FOR
THE RIGHT To DIE, HANDBOOK OF LIVING WILL LAWS (1987 & Supp. 1988) [hereinafter LIVING WILLS].

Subsequent to the major writing of this article, a federal statute was enacted which requires
virtually every health care facility to notify a patient, on admission, of that patient's right to
create an advanced directive, or living will. According to the statute, health care facilities are
required:
(A) to provide written information to each [patient] concerning (i) an individual's rights under state law . . . to make decisions concerning . . .
medical care, including the right to accept or refuse medical treatment and the right
to formulate advanced directives, and,
(ii) the provider's or organization's written policies respecting the implementation
of such rights.
Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388, 115, 204 (1990).
This statute illustrates Congress' intent to make advanced directives and integral part of health
care law.
3. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 1337.11 to 1337.17 (Anderson 1989) (enacted June 28, 1989).
4. The phrase surrogate decisionmaker refers to an individual who becomes the primary
actor in making health care decisions for a patient who is otherwise incapable of making such
decisions for himself. In Ohio, the phrase "durable power of attorney for health care" is used to
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/24
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Prior legislative history5 has indicated the Ohio Assembly's intent
to provide every individual with the autonomous decision-making right
recognized by most courts in this country today.' This note discusses
the effectiveness of Am. Sub. S.B. 1, also known as Ohio's new Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (MURTIA), 7 as a tool
for health care patients to exercise their autonomous decisionmaking
rights, focusing primarily on what type of impact Am. Sub. S.B. 1 will
have on Ohio's health care community. First, this note briefly discusses
what type of legal foundations exist for the right to refuse medical
treatment and the right to make decisions regarding self-determination.
Second, the note explores the history of Ohio's case law both prior to
the enactment of its first Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
law (HC-DPA) and during the hiatus between Ohio's 1989 HC-DPA
and the subsequent enactment of MURTIA. Finally, the note analyzes
the strengths and weaknesses of Ohio's new living will statute and suggests possible changes to correct some of the weaknesses and problems
inherent in MURTIA.
The note concludes that although Ohio's version of the Uniform
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 8 is not without criticism, on the whole,
it serves as a substantive, progressive piece of legislation which will
provide an adequate preliminary foundation to address the ever-growing need for a uniform body of law to guide Ohio health care patients.
The new statute allows all Ohio health care patients an opportunity to
ensure that their health care preferences and choices are honored under
any medical circumstance.

define a substitute or surrogate decisionmaker. See also Marshall B. Kapp, Ohio's New Durable
Power of Attorney, 14 U. DAYTON L. REv. 541 (1989).
5. Kapp, supra note 4, at 542 n.9. A living will bill was pending in the Ohio legislature at
the end of 1989, but was never passed. H. 56, 118th Ohio Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (1989).
6. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (N.J. 1985) (right to self-determination
ordinarily outweighs any countervailing state interests and competent persons generally are permitted to refuse medical treatment, even at risk of death); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (right of incompetent in bersistent vegetative state to refuse
medical treatment not disregarded solely on basis that condition prevents conscious exercise of the
choice); In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987) (legally competent inpatient at mental hospital had right to refuse life-saving medical treatment even though
decision was based on delusion); Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1984) (patient has cause of action in common law battery for initiation of life-sustaining treatment measures against patient's express wishes).
7. Chapter 2133 of the Ohio Revised Code, as enacted by S. 1, shall be entitled the Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (MURTIA). S. 1, 119th Ohio Gen. Assembly, Reg.
Sess., § 2133.15(2) (1991).
8. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL ACT, §§ 1-18, 9A U.L.A. 456 (Supp 1986).
Drafted and approved for enactment in all states by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform
Laws (NCCUSL).
See, e.g., LIVING WILLS, supra note 2, at 135.
Published
byState
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1991

1092

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW
II.

[VOL. 17:3

BACKGROUND

Prior to the recent insurgence of living will and durable power of
attorney for health care legislation, courts relied primarily upon common law principles of informed consent, battery, and negligence as bases for providing health care law to those patients making health care
decisions. 9 Courts struggled in cases where a patient was incompetent,1" incapable of making a medical choice, or unable to give informed consent to certain treatment.1" Such cases primarily arose when
the patient was permanently unconscious 2 and the patient had no reasonable possibility of regaining consciousness in order to make a treatment decision.
Because of the difficulties inherent in common law health care
principles, state legislatures recognized a need for living will legislation.
Before addressing the adoption of living will legislation, however, it is
important to explore more adequately the history of common law as it
relates to patient health care decisions. By contrasting common law
with more recent statutory legislation, the significant and important
impact of living will legislation on health care law becomes very
apparent.
A.

Foundationfor the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment

1. Common Law
The doctrine of informed consent requires health care personnel to
receive the informed consent of the patient prior to performing any

9. See infra notes 13-22 and accompanying text (discussion of informed consent, battery
and negligence).
10. See infra note 21 and accompanying text (explanation of patient incompetence).
11. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 587 (D.R.I. 1988) ("The right to refuse
medical treatment 'must extend to the case of an incompetent, as well as competent, patient because the value of human dignity extends to both' ") (quoting Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 634 (Mass. 1986)). Id. But see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1364 (2d ed. 1988) "[A]ttributing 'rights' to these patients is somewhat
problematic . . . in the face of the recognition that they could make no decisions about how to
exercise any such rights.
...
Id. at 1368 n.25.
12. The Ohio Revised Code states:
"Permanently unconscious state" means a state of permanent unconsciousness in a principal that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as determined in accordance with
reasonable medical standards by the principal's attending physician and one other physician who has examined the principal, is characterized by both of the following:
(1) The principal is irreversibly unaware of himself and his environment.
(2) There is a total loss of cerebral cortical functioning, resulting in the principal
having no capacity to experience pain or suffering.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11(T) (Anderson 1991).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/24
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medical procedures.13 Inherent in the doctrine of informed consent is
the common law principle of self-determination or individual autonomy." Historically, courts enforce the doctrine of informed consent
15
with the common law tort theories of battery and negligence. For example, if a doctor provides any form of medical treatment without the
6
consent of the patient, the doctor has committed a battery.' Some
commentators note that courts have departed from the tort theory of
battery and have focused instead on the negligence theory of liability in
7
order to avoid labelling doctors as having committed a battery.' The
negligence theory of liability is limited, however, in that a patient can
only recover and be compensated for physical injuries that directly result from the medical treatment.' 8 If no physical injury has occurred or
if the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm to the patient, then
9
it may be difficult to recover using a negligence theory.' Courts in
most states, including those jurisdictions that prefer the negligence theory of informed consent, have agreed that an action for common law
battery exists whenever the patient being treated does not consent to
the procedure.2 0
These common law theories of battery and negligence do not fare
well in informed consent cases where the patient is an incompetent individual." The doctrine of informed consent is difficult to apply in

See W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at
13.
190-91 (5th ed. 1984).
14. See, e.g., Comment, Developments in the Law - Medical Technology and the Law, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1522, 1672 (1990) [hereinafter Medical Technology].
A majority of courts find the right to refuse medical treatment and sustenance under the
common law doctrine requiring that medical personnel receive the 'informed consent' of the
patient prior to performing any medical procedure. Based on the common law principle of
individual autonomy, the [common law] doctrine seeks to vindicate the right of every person to determine what will be done to his body.
Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 & cmt. a (1979); KEETON, supra
note 13, § 9, at 40.
17. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE, 118 (1987); KEETON, supra note 13, § 32, at 190.
18. KEETON, supra note 13, § 32, at 190.
19. Id.
20. See APPELBAUM, supra note 17, at 118.
21. Certain individuals may be incompetent for a number of reasons. Through genetic or
other mental deficiencies, they may not possess adequate cognitive reasoning ability to make an
informed decision. Otherwise competent individuals also may be unconscious and not able to make
health care choices. Courts are confronted with especially difficult situations when a physician
determines that there is no reasonable or likely possibility that a patient will gain or regain the
competence necessary to make an informed decision. Where no patient competence exists or is not
likely to exist, courts are often placed precariously in the position of second guessing what a
Published
eCommons,
if such a patient Vere able to choose. Herein lies the difficulty of
would be1991
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those situations where a patient has no ability to form an opinion with
regard to the consent of certain medical procedures. In such a case, the
patient is unable to fulfill the consent element of the doctrine. In cases
where a patient has neither the ability to consent nor to refuse certain
treatment, commentators have noted that physicians are required to obtain the consent of an authorized third party before initiating treatment.22 Although such a requirement may work as a proper safeguard
against unwanted treatment in certain cases, common law principles
cannot guarantee that the wishes of the incompetent individual will assuredly be followed in every case. This is particularly so when no specific third party has been authorized to make health care decisions for
the incompetent patient.
Case law illustrates the difficulties that courts face when trying to
decide appropriate action under varying circumstances. 3 Courts tried
to establish arbitrary standards of care and attempted to create decisionmaking hypotheses as a basis for making treatment decisions with
respect to incompetent patients. 2' In certain cases, the medical profession has had difficulty clarifying what constitutes "extraordinary treatment" 5 or "invasive technique. ' 26 Consequently, court decisions reflect
the uncertainty that permeates cases involving health care decisions. As
a result of the common law doctrine of informed consent, a physician's

relying upon common law principles of informed consent. See generally Medical Technology,
supra note 14.
22.

RUTH R.

FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 36 (1986).
23. Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (although trial judge concluded that patient's decision to forego surgery was irrational, the judge failed to make a "clear
cut finding" that patient lacked "requisite legal competence"); see also In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d
255, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987) (legally competent patient at mental hospital had right to
refuse life-saving medical treatment even though her decision was based on a delusion).

24. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1977) (court rationalized decision by postulating what a profoundly retarded man might
have chosen to do if he had ever been competent); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (court tried to balance "invasive technique" of procedure to patient's
privacy with "extraordinary care" necessary to keep patient alive, as means of making treatment
decisions); see also infra note 25 and accompanying text.
25. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 654. The court established terminology such as "extraordinary
treatment" and "invasive technique" in order to describe situations where a patient was kept alive
exclusively by extraordinary health care means. The most typical examples would be a patient
who is kept alive on a life-support system such as a respirator or by means of tube feeding food
and water. Under these examples, a patient would not be able to eat, drink, breathe or summarily
survive on his own without the extraordinary treatment. Under such circumstances, some form of
patient informed-consent is a necessary requirement.
26. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 68 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); see also
supra notes 24-25 (explanation of "invasive technique" and "extraordinary treatment.").
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/24
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fear of not only civi 2 7 but also criminal2 8 liability for either foregoing
treatment or for implementing treatment without patient consent, can
obscure the express wishes of the patient. The use of common law doctrines as a means of effectuating health care decisions has created uncertainty and apprehension where consistency and confidence are
needed.
2.

The Constitutional Basis: State Interests v. Autonomy

When courts attempt to apply the common law concepts of battery, negligence, and informed consent to the refusal of treatment context, they balance the patient's interest in autonomy against the four
state interests recognized in the due process context. 9 The state interests involved are: (1) preserving life; (2) protecting innocent third parties (e.g. children); (3) preventing suicide; and (4) maintaining the 'ethical integrity of the medical profession.3 0 It is in this context that courts
have found a constitutional basis for the right to refuse medical
treatment.
a.

The Privacy Right and the Due Process Clause

The New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Quinlan, cited the right
3 1
to privacy as a basis for the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
The Quinlan court's doctrinal analysis was minimal, however, primarily
focusing on the statement made by the court that just as the right of
privacy encompasses a woman's abortion decision, "[p]resumably [it] is
broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical
treatment under certain circumstances." ' 3 Although a number of states
have since adopted the Quinlan court's approach,3" recent United
States Supreme Court decisions restricting the right of privacy, as well
as the liberty right in the Due Process Clause,34 have personal choice
27. See Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809, 814-15 (Ohio 1980). Fear of
civil liability usually arises in a malpractice case where it can be argued that any reasonable
doctor would have continued treatment. Id.
28. See Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). Criminal tort liability may arise in cases where a physician commits a battery by initiating treatment
against a non-consenting patient. Id.
29. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223-26 (N.J. 1985); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977).
30. Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1223-26; Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
31. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
32. Id. at 663.
33. See. e.g., State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989) (competent quadriplegic's right
to privacy and liberty outweigh any state interest); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Ctr., 426
N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1980) (terminally ill incompetent patient's right to choose medical
treatment outweighs state interests).
34. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Cruzan v. HarPublished
eCommons,
1991
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proponents3" looking elsewhere for adequate protection of the right to
make health care decisions. Courts after Quinlan continue to struggle
with the fine distinctions between terms such as ordinary care and extraordinary care, life-saving and life-sustaining, and withholding versus
withdrawing of medical treatment.3 6
The United States Supreme Court, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,3 7 addressed the issue of what constitutional rights actually exist with regard to medical decisions. Petitioner,

Nancy Beth Cruzan, was an incompetent patient as a result of injuries
sustained in an automobile accident.3 " She was diagnosed as -being in a
persistent vegetative state.3 9 The Court refused to address the privacy

issue. Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in the majority opinion
that the Due Process Clause protects a citizen's interest in life, as well
as the corollary interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.4 0
This recognition by the Court was directed toward a competent individual only, resulting in the Court's adoption of a different approach to

dealing with incompetent persons.
b.

Standards Applied to Incompetent Individuals

The Supreme Court in Cruzan adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard4 2 when addressing the petitioner's argument that in(refusing to allow withdrawal of feeding tubes because continued artificial feeding was not burdensome to the vegetative patient).
35. Personal choice proponents are those individuals who believe in the right to make health
care choices through the doctrines of self-determination and self-autonomy.
36. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text; Martha Norton Mullins, Comment, The
Need for Guidance in Decisionmakingfor Terminally III Incompetents: Is the Ohio Legislature
in a "'PersistentVegetative State"?, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 827, 832-33 n.33.
37. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (interim ed. 1990).
38. Id. at 2844.
39. Id. at 2845. The Court described a persistent vegetative state as "a condition in which a
person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function [e.g.
brain function]." Id.
40. Id. at 2853.
41. Id. at 2851.
42. Id. at 2853. Under this standard, an authorized third party or surrogate decisionmaker
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that any decision she makes on behalf of the
patient accurately reflects the patient's own wishes. The clear and convincing evidence standard of
proof, as defined by the Court, was "proof sufficient to persuade the trier of fact that the patient
held a firm and settled commitment to the termination of life supports under the circumstances
like those presented." Id. at 2855 n.l 1 (quoting In re Westchester County Medical Ctr. ex rel.
O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988); see also infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text;
In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 441 (N.J. 1987). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as evidence
which
produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the
allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as
to enable [the trier of fact] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of
the precise facts in issue.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/24
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competent persons had a right to refuse treatment through a surrogate
decisionmaker."3 The Court reasoned that such a strict evidentiary
standard was necessary under circumstances where (1) the decision
was particularly important (preservation of human life) and (2) such a
decision would have all of the elements of finality and irrevocability
attached to it.44 As a result, the wishes of an incompetent patient need
to be clearly indicated before the individual becomes incapacitated. Evidentiary problems arise under such scrutiny since very few people have
the foresight to execute advance directives, or even contemplate death
or incompetence."
In order to address the problems associated with incompetent patients, courts have formulated two standards that allow third parties or
surrogate decisionmakers to exercise the rights of the incompetent to
refuse treatment. These standards are referred to as the "substituted
' and the "best interests"" 7 standards. The substituted judgjudgment" 46
ment standard allows a surrogate decisionmaker to make a decision
that the incompetent patient would make if he were able to do so. "8
Many courts have adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard
for the substituted judgment approach. "9
Although the substituted judgment approach has been the most
widely accepted, 50 it is not without criticism. It is often difficult to obtain clear indications of a patient's actual wishes, unless the incompetent individual created some sort of advance directive, for example, a
living will, prior to her incapacity. Particularly in cases where evidentiary requirements are more relaxed, or where financial burdens cloud a
surrogate decisionmaker's thoughts, substituted judgment standards
can be undermined.5 1 In addition, the substituted judgment standard

Id.
43. Id. at 2853.
44. Id.
45. Medical Technology, supra note 14, at 1646-47.
46. See In re Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 399 (1988); In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984) (en banc).
47. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427, 431,
434 (Mass. 1977).
48. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE &
BIOMEDICAL

& BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING To FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT

132 (1983) [hereinafter DECIDING To FOREGO].
49. See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2854-55.
50. See ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT To DIE § 9.10, at 268 (1989).
51. Medical Technology, supra note 14, at 1646-47; see also Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp.
580 (D.R.I. 1988) (federal court accepted lessened evidentiary standard as basis for allowing ter-,
mination of treatment, relying upon conversations dating back eleven years between patient and
both husband and sister-in-law about Quinlan case which resulted in husband promising not to
her eCommons,
with life-sustaining
provide by
Published
1991treatment in similar circumstances).
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fails in cases involving patients who were never competent. 52 In such
cases, there is no possible way to determine what the patient would
decide if competent since the patient was never competent. Substituted
judgment, therefore, becomes mere speculation when no reliable evidence of the patient's intent can be found. In Cruzan, the Supreme
Court held that the substituted judgment of close family members need
not be accepted by a court in the absence of substantial proof that their
views reflect the views of the patient.5 3
The "best interests" standard has been adopted by a minority of
courts. 54 This approach allows the surrogate decisionmaker to. evaluate
medical options for the patient according to "societally shared criteria," regardless of whether the medical treatment in question serves the
patient's best interests. 55 A surrogate decisionmaker must take into account a variety of factors when assessing what treatment, if any, is best
for the patient.5 6 Such factors include the patient's current condition,
loss of dignity, degree of pain and suffering, family situation and the
57
benefits of each treatment option.
The best interests standard has the same infirmities found in the
substituted judgment standard. The best interests standard assumes
that the surrogate decisionmaker can and will make a reasonably wellbalanced decision regarding the interests of the patient. What may
seem reasonable by society's perspective (e.g. societally shared criteria)
primarily depends on the surrogate decisionmaker's view of societal values. 58 In some cases, it is plausible that the patient and the surrogate
decisionmaker have somewhat different perspectives with regard to societal values. The result may lead to surrogate decisions that do' not
completely reflect the best interests of the patient. 59
When comparing the substituted judgment and best interests standards, only a semantic distinction exists. After all, a patient's own
judgment is the clearest proof of what treatment is in her best interests.
Absent such judgment, courts try to fashion a set of societal balancing

52. See

DECIDING To FOREGO, supra note 48, at 133.
53. 110 S. Ct. at 2855. The Court required that a clear and convincing evidence standard
must be met when trying to exercise a substituted judgement procedure. Id.
54. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-33 (N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at
361-68.

55. See

DECIDING

To

FOREGO,

supra note 48, at 134-35; Medical Technology, supra note

DECIDING

To

FOREGO,

supra note 48, at 180.

14, at 1651.

56. See

57. id.
58. Medical Technology, supra note 14, at 1653.
59. Id. at 1653 (best interests may be shifted to best interests of family rather than patient,
or in other cases, healthy and vibrant individuals who are surrogate decisionmakers may undervalue the worth to a debilitated person of his existence).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/24
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factors to establish which course of treatment is best for the patient. 60
Both the substituted judgment and best interest standards try to establish the intent and wishes of the patient. Substituted judgment relies on
clear and convincing evidence of what an incompetent patient would
choose to do, if able. When no clear and convincing evidence exists,
some courts prefer to use the best interests standard by trying to determine what is best for the patient based on societally shared criteria. 6 1
Under either standard, courts and surrogate decisionmakers are burdened with the difficult task of determining an incompetent patient's
wishes, since such wishes most accurately reflect what is best for the
patient.
The inconsistent and often illogical results reached through both
constitutional and common law standards have led many jurisdictions
to enact living will statutes in order to define health care options for
both competent and incompetent patients.6 2 With the enactment of
Am. Sub. S.B. 1, Ohio has joined those jurisdictions in adopting statutory guidelines as a means of better anticipating the needs of its medical patients.
B.

Ohio's Health Care History

Ohio's case law history regarding health care decisions reflects the
inherent need for uniform statutory guidelines to equip physicians, patients and their families with better options to make appropriate health
care decisions. Ohio precedent suggests that the Ohio Supreme Court
and the Ohio General Assembly have been reluctant to address topics
on the use or refusal of life support treatment with regard to medical
patients.
Ohio courts first discussed the topic in Leach v. Akron General
Medical Center. 3 Edna Leach was a seventy year old woman who, on
June 11, 1980, entered a hospital and was diagnosed as having amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, a progressively deteriorating disease which affected the nervous system.64 Mrs. Leach was later admitted to Akron
General Medical Center where she suffered a cardiac arrest on July 29,
1980, and subsequently lapsed into a chronic vegetative state. 5 Expert
testimony revealed that Mrs. Leach's likelihood of recovery to a cognitive state 6 was highly improbable. 7 In light of these facts, the court

60. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
63. 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1980).
64. Id. at 810.
65. Id.; see supra note 39.
66. by
SeeeCommons,
supra note 39.1991
Published
67. Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Ctr., 426 N.E.2d at 811.
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adopted the approach of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Quinlan
and ruled that the constitutional right to privacy affords a patient, such
as Mrs. Leach, a right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.6 8
The court also used the clear and convincing evidence standard as a
means for determining whether the patient would prefer to forego
treatment if she were able to make a choice, and found that removal of
69
Mrs. Leach's respirator was warranted.
Although the Leach court established a constitutional basis to refuse medical treatment in Ohio, it also illustrated some inconsistencies
70
that have plagued courts with respect to Ohio health care decisions.
Leach was a case of first impression and its holding is not binding on
the Ohio courts since it is a trial court decision. 7'1 Leach also fails to
address the essential issue of whether a patient may refuse life-sustaining treatment before it is given, or must wait until such treatment
is given before seeking court-administered intervention.7'2 Finally,
Leach reopens common law and constitutional problems facing physicians who are concerned with seeking a probate court order before dis73
continuing treatment for fear of civil or criminal liability.
Under the same factual circumstances presented in Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, an Ohio appeals court addressed the issue
of Mrs. Leach's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment prior to its
initial use. 74 In this corollary to the first Leach case, the court applied
the common law doctrines of battery and informed consent rather than
the constitutional right to privacy approach found in the first Leach
decision.7 5 Although the court recognized the right of a terminally ill

68. Id. at 816.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Couture v. Couture, 549 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (strictly applying
the provisions of Ohio's 1989 Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care law, the court misconstrued intent of Ohio General Assembly and consequently denied withdrawal of treatment to patient); Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (the court failed to
define who would be considered an authorized person for the purposes of making health care
decisions for an incompetent patient); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio
Ct. C.P. 1980) (the court did not determine whether patient may refuse medical treatment prior
to its inception, or whether patient must wait until treatment is administered before refusal can be
sought). See generally James M. Jones, Note, Toward an Ohio Natural Death Act; The Need for
Living Will Legislation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 1019, 1021 (1985). The Couture decision basically
eliminated the effectiveness of Ohio's 1989 HC-DPA and demonstrates how the Couture court
misconstrued the intent of the Ohio General Assembly with respect to the 1989 HC-DPA. See
infra note 95.
71. Leach, 426, N.E.2d at 816.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 814-15; see also supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
74. Estate of Leach, 469 N.E.2d at 1050.
75. Id. at 1051-52; see also supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
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patient, either competent or incompetent, to refuse life-sustaining treatment, it ultimately failed to fill the existing gaps in Ohio health care
law.
The second Leach decision is riddled with vague dicta and holdings. The court's holding allows a terminally ill patient to recover in
tort from a physician who provides treatment against the express
wishes of the patient. 7' Although other courts have provided an explanation of the term "express wish," the second Leach court never articulated what constitutes an express wish. 7 The court was again vague
when it determined that an incompetent patient may consent to treatment through an authorized person, but failed to state who might be
78
considered or defined as an authorized person.
The two Leach cases illustrate the inherent problems in dealing
with health care decisions by applying constitutional and common law
standards. Mere case by case analyses without legislative guidelines
often leave Ohio courts trapped in the position of speculators. 79 The
only case in which the Ohio Supreme Court ruled on the right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment was predicated on constitutionally based religious freedom8" and fell outside the specific scope of health care issues
raised in the Leach cases.
Until 1989, Ohio citizens relied primarily on the poorly enunciated
holdings of the Leach cases. On June 28, 1989, however, the Ohio Legislature enacted its first Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
law (HC-DPA), 1 primarily in response to the lack of pertinent legal
authority on the issue, but also as a means of modernizing Ohio health
care law."2 Over the past decade, the Ohio legislature considered a variety of living will legislation, but none successfully made it through
both houses until Am. Sub. S.B. 1.83 Until Am. Sub. S.B. 1, the only

76. Estate of Leach, 469 N.E.2d at 1053.
77. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 70, at 1025.
78. Id.; see also Estate of Leach, 469 N.E.2d at 1052.
79. Without a clear legislative provision, such as a living will statute, courts must resort to
subjective standards of evidence and proof when trying to determine the wishes of the patient.
80. In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987) (although
patient had long-time delusion that she was wife of a Reverend Jenkins and that he would, perhaps, heal her infirmities, her belief in spiritual healing stood on its own, without regard to delusion, as means for refusing medical treatment).
81. OHfo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11-.17 (Anderson 1989).
82. See generally Kapp, supra note 4.
83. See generally Mullins, supra note 36. Living will legislation that has failed to pass
through both houses includes: H. 137, 114th Ohio Gen. Assembly (1981-1982); H. 331, 115th
Ohio Gen. Assembly (1983-1984); H. 220, 116th Ohio Gen. Assembly (1985-1986); S. 383, 118th
Ohio Gen.byAssembly
(1989-1990).
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other legislation to address health care decisionmaking was the 1989
84
version of Ohio's HC-DPA law.
The 1989 Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care law has
been called a "poorly drafted stopgap measure" 85 by one detractor; another commentator has pointed to numerous deficiencies within the legislation.8 Couture v. Couture illustrated the problems inherent in
.Ohio's 1989 HC-DPA law.8 The Couture case involved twenty-nineyear old Daniel Couture who was diagnosed as being in a persistent
vegetative state.8 8 The medical testimony revealed that Daniel was in a
persistent vegetative state with "no medically recognized prospect of
recovery."8 8 The court subsequently pronounced that "Bertha J. Couture, as such Guardian, is entitled to make those decisions for further
treatment and care . . .which would be best for the ward and in accordance with the desires of the ward." 9 Additional evidence revealed
the patient's intent to forego medical treatment under such circumOHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11-.17.
85. Jones, supra note 70, at 1034.
86. Kapp, supra note 4, at 550-57. The limitations concerning an agent's (surrogate decisionmaker's) prerogatives in the realm of artificial feeding and hydration are overbroad and inherently counterproductive. Ohio's HC-DPA law not only seeks to foreclose surrogate decisions to
remove nutrition and hydration once they have been initiated, but it also attempts to prevent
agents from withholding or refusing nutrition and hydration in the first place. As a result, many
incompetent patients may be forced to receive nutrition and hydration in cases where they normally could forego such treatment through a substitute decisionmaker. Id.; see also OHIO REV.

84.

CODE ANN. § 1337.13.

Under Ohio Revised Code section 1337.13(E)(2), the second condition necessary before nutrition and hydration can be withdrawn makes the act unduly restrictive. The agent's or surrogate
decisionmaker's right to refuse nutrition and hydration on behalf of the patient is initiated only
when death of the patient is imminent and when the withholding of nutrition and hydration is not
likely to result in the death of the patient by malnutrition or dehydration, or when the patient's
life would be shortened by such action. The logic here is contradictory since the patient's death by
removal of the feeding tubes is the intended outcome of the procedure. Such death will proximately result from the lack of nutrition and hydration to the patient. Kapp, supra note 4, at 55258.
In terms of revocation, Ohio Revised Code section 1337.14(A) provides that revocation of a
durable power of attorney designation can be done orally or in writing to either the attending
physician or the designated attorney in fact (surrogate decisionmaker), or by doing any other act
(e.g. destroying the instrument) which constitutes an intent to revoke. This section presumes the
principal's (patient's) capacity to revoke "unless there is evidence to the contrary." The statute is
completely -silent with respect to the nature and weight of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption of capacity.
Section 1337.15(B) presents contradictory language when discussing the immunities afforded
to physicians who provide or fail to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. Such immunities completely undermine the already established common law principals of battery and informed consent
by allowing the physician the opportunity to contravene completely the attorney in fact's decisions
regarding express patient wishes. Kapp, supra note 4, at 558.
87. 549 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 572.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/24
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stances.9 1 Despite both the court's assignment of Mrs. Couture as
guardian and the uncontroverted medical testimony, Bertha Couture
was unsuccessful in her attempts to withdraw nutrition and hydration

care from her son, Daniel.9 2 The Ohio Court of Appeals used a strict
application of the public policy standards set forth by the Ohio legisla-

ture in Am. Sub. S.B. 13,1 3 otherwise known as Ohio's 1989 HC-DPA
law. Adhering to Am. Sub. S.B. 13's strict standards for refusal of nutrition and hydration treatment, the Couture court found that the con-

ditions set forth in the bill to allow the discontinuance of nutrition and
hydration "namely, that the patient's death be 'imminent' with or without artificial sustenance and that the removal of nutrition and hydration not result in death by malnutrition or dehydration-were not
satisfied." 9 4

The Couture decision created a question of whether a person can
rely on the 1989 version of the HC-DPA law to assure that her health
care preferences will be honored under any circumstance. Ohio Senator
Richard H. Finan suggested that the Couture decision illustrated the

inconsistencies between the intent of the Ohio General Assembly with
respect to the 1989 HC-DPA law, and the Couture court's subsequent
interpretation of that intent.9 5 Senator Finan explained that, as courts

in Ohio and other states became more significantly involved with making health care decisions for incompetent patients, the Ohio General
Assembly recognized the need for living will legislation coupled with a
conforming durable power of attorney for health care law. 96

91. Id. at 576. Bertha Couture testified that Daniel had made statements after viewing
television programs that he would not want his life prolonged by the extraordinary means of life
support systems. Id. She also testified that his statements had been made on several occasions over
four or five years and with the knowledge that his own medical problems posed that risk. Id.
92. Id. at 577.
93. Ohio's new HC-DPA law sections 1337.11-.17 of the Ohio Revised Code had not been
officially enacted at the time of the Couture case. The appeals court in Couture, nevertheless,
adopted the Ohio Legislature's policy intent, which it determined as being opposed to the withdrawal of nutrition or hydration under circumstances where the result would be death by malnutrition or dehydration despite the wishes of the patient or his surrogate decisionmaker. Id. at 575;
see also Kapp, supra note 4, at 555.
94. See Kapp, supra note 4, at 555; see also Couture, 549 N.E.2d at 575.
95. Telephone interview with Senator Richard H. Finan, Ohio General Assembly and sponsor of MURTIA (Oct. 3, 1991). Senator Finan stated that the Couture decision basically "killed"
Ohio's 1989 HC-DPA and that the Couture court's definitions were obviously different from those
which the Ohio General Assembly intended when it enacted the 1989 HC-DPA law. Id.
Cf. In re Guardianship of Crum, 580 N.E.2d 876 (Ohio Prob. 1991) (court used the impending enactment of Am. Sub. S.B. I as a means of determining the legislative intent of the Ohio
General Assembly when it allowed coguardians to discontinue the tubular administration of nutrition and hydration to their incompetent ward who was in a vegetative state).
96.byId.
Published
eCommons, 1991
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MURTIA

PROVISIONS

A.

General Provision

Am. Sub. S.B. 1" authorizes the execution at any time of a declaration in which the declarant specifies whether he wishes life-sustaining
treatment to be used, continued, withheld, or withdrawn by his attending physician if he should be in a terminal condition or in a permanently unconscious state.9 8 This declaration is commonly referred to as
a living will. The attending physician must also determine that the patient is no longer able to make informed decisions regarding the administration of the treatment and that there is no reasonable possibility the
patient will regain the capacity to make those decisions.99
B. MURTIA (Provisionsfor Individuals who Execute a Living Will
Document)
Ohio's new Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
(MURTIA)'1 ° is found in sections 2133.01 through 2133.15 of the
Ohio Revised Code.1 01 The act permits an adult who is of sound mind
to execute a voluntary declaration that will govern the use, continuation, withholding, or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and may
include a designation by the declarant of one or more persons who are
to be notified by the attending physician any time that life-sustaining
treatment will be withheld or withdrawn."' Although the language in
section 2133.02 implies that a patient, by her own discretion, "may
include a designation . . . of one or more persons who are to be noti-

fied" of treatment decisions, the statute later requires physicians to notify specified family members of treatment decisions, regardless of
whether such notification was designated by the patient in her declara-

97. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11-.17 and 2101.24 amended, §§ 2133.01-.15 enacted.
98. S. I (Preliminary Summary July 1991), 119th Ohio Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess., at 1 (1991).
Persistent vegetative state would fall under this category as well.
99. Id.
100. As adopted from the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act. See supra note 8.
101. MURTIA was codified at Ohio Revised Code sections 2133.01-.15 (Anderson 1991).
102. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.02(A)(1). A similar notification provision is set out in
Ohio Revised Code section 1337.16 of the 1991 HC-DPA law. Both MURTIA and the HC-DPA
law's notification provisions are mandatory. Both the HC-DPA law and MURTIA provide a descending order of priority list of who is to be notified: (1) if any, the guardian of the patient; (2)
the patient's spouse; (3) the principal's adult children who are available within a reasonable period
of time for consultation with the principal's attending physician; (4) the principal's parents; (5) an
adult sibling of the principal or, if there is more than one sibling, a majority of the patient's adult
siblings who are located within a reasonable period of time for such consultation. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 1337.16, 2133.05(A)(2)(a)(ii).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/24
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tion. 0 3 Life-sustaining treatment means any medical procedure, treat-

ment, intervention, or other measure that, when administered to a patient, will serve principally to prolong the process of dying.10 4
1. Form Requirements
The statute requires that a declaration must be signed by its declarant or by another individual at the declarant's discretion, state the
date of execution, and be witnessed or acknowledged before a notary
public.10 5 Each witness must be an adult and subscribe his signature on
the declaration.'
Section 2133.02 therefore requires either a notary
public or two witnesses to certify or attest to the patient's living will
document.
In order to clarify whether the declarant intends her declaration to
apply to circumstances where she is in a terminal condition, in a permanently unconscious state, or in both circumstances, her declaration
must so state the terms "terminal condition" and "permanently unconscious state" as defined by the terminology provisions of MURTIA.' °7
When a terminal patient authorizes the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment, the comfort care provisions of the MURTIA
will govern the subsequent treatment. 08 When the declarant is in a
permanently unconscious state, he must have specified in the declara-

103. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.02 (A)(1).
104. Id. § 2133.02(A)(2).
105. Id.
106. Id. The two witnesses cannot be related by blood, adoption or marriage to the declarant, patient, nor can they be the attending physician or administrator of the health facility in
which the patient resides. Id.
107. Id. The MURTIA defines a terminal condition as:
an irreversible, incurable, and untreatable condition caused by disease, illness, or injury
from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as determined in accordance with
reasonable medical standards by a patient's attending physician and one other physician
who has examined [him] (e.g. consulting physician), there can be no recovery [and] death
is likely to occur within a relatively short time if life-sustaining treatment is not
administered.
Id. § 2133.01. A permanently unconscious state is defined as "a state of permanent unconsciousness in a patient that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as determined in accordance
with reasonable medical standards . . . by the patient's attending physician and [a consulting
physician]", is characterized by the patient being "irreversibly unaware of himself and his environment [and] ... a total loss of cerebral cortical functioning, resulting in the ... patient having
no capacity to experience pain or suffering." Id. § 2133.01(U).
108. Id. § 2133.02(A)(3)(b). MURTIA defines comfort care as nutrition or hydration
"when administered to diminish the pain or discomfort of... a patient, not to postpone his death,
[and] any other medical or nursing procedure, treatment, intervention, or other measure that is
taken to diminish the pain or discomfort of [the] . . .patient, not to postpone hisdeath." Id.
Published
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tion that he authorizes the withdrawal or withholding of nutrition or
hydration. 10 9
2.

When the Declaration Takes Effect

A declaration becomes operative when (1) it is communicated to
the declarant's attending physician; (2) the attending physician and a
consulting physician determine that the declarant is in a terminal condition or in a state of permanent unconsciousness; (3) the attending
physician determines that the declarant is no longer able to make informed decisions; and (4) the attending physician determines, in good
faith, and to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and standards,
there is no reasonable possibility that the declarant will ever regain the
ability to make informed decisions."' It is important to note that the
declaration will only become operative if all four of the above mentioned criteria are satisfied. Therefore, it is essential that the attending
physician know of the existence of a living will.
The living will also does not become automatically operative when
a patient is in a terminal or permanently unconscious condition. First,
the physician must determine to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the patient will never regain the ability to make her own
health care decisions. As long as a patient can make health care decisions, or may be able to make informed health care decisions some time
in the reasonably foreseeable future, then the declaration continues to
have no effect.
When a declaration becomes operative, a physician has three basic
responsibilities: (1) to record medical determinations in conjunction
with any record of the declaration; (2) to make a good faith effort to
notify individuals designated in the declaration of any decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment; and (3) to allow time for
the notified individuals to object to such treatment decisions.'
This
section of MURTIA requires that statutorily specified family members
be notified regardless of whether the patient requested such
notification. 12

109.

Id. " 'Nutrition' means sustenance that is artificially or technologically administered."
§ 1337.11(T). Hydration is defined as "fluids that are artificially or technologically administered. Id. § 1337.11(N).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2133.03.
111. Id.§ 2133.05.
112. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/24
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Revocation

A declarant may revoke a declaration at any time and in any manner.1 13 A revocation generally becomes effective when the declarant expresses his intent to revoke, but, if the attending physician is aware of
the declaration, then the declarant must convey the revocation to: (1)
the attending physician; (2) a witness to the revocation; or (3) health
care personnel who are informed of the revocation by the witness 1 4 in
order for the revocation to become effective. The revocation provisions
in the 1991 HC-DPA law and MURTIA also allow the attending physician to rely on witness information of alleged patient revocation as a
means for invalidating an existing living will declaration. 1 5 The attending physician has discretionary power to act either in accordance with
the revocation information provided by the witness or to disregard it
and honor the provisions of the declaration. 1 16
4.

Limitations

According to the statute, there are three limitations with respect to
the operation of declarations: (1) as long as a declarant who has been
determined to be in either a terminal condition or permanently unconscious state can make informed decisions, she can continue to do so; (2)
the responsibility of a physician or other authorized health care personnel to provide comfort care is unaffected; and (3) life-sustaining treatment cannot be withdrawn or withheld from a pregnant declarant if
such treatment will result in the death of the fetus. 7 If the fetus, to a
reasonable medical certainty, will not be born alive, then this limitation
is void."
5.

Objection Procedure

Notified individuals 1 9 have the option to object to the treatment
decisions of the health care facility or of the declarant's surrogate decisionmaker.1 20 Within forty-eight hours after the receipt of a notice
from the patient's attending physician, a notified individual must advise

113. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.04, § 1337.14(A). Both MURTIA and the 1991 HCDPA law eliminate all statutory language referring to a patient's capacity to revoke, thus avoiding
complication with defining the nature and weight of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption
of capacity. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
114. Id. §§ 2133.04, 1337.14(A).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. § 2133.06.
118. Id.
119. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
120. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.05(B). See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.05
Published
by eCommons,
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the patient's physician whether he objects to the physician's medical
determinations with regard to the patient."' 1 The reasons that can be
given for the objection are limited to the following: (1) that the course
of action proposed by the attending physician is not authorized by or
within the scope of the declaration; (2) that the declaration was executed when the patient was not of sound mind, or was subject to duress, fraud, or undue influence; or (3) that the declaration does not
substantially comply with the provisions of MURTIA. 22
Once the objection is communicated to the attending physician,
then the objecting individual must file a specified complaint within two
business days after the communication in the probate court of the
county in which the patient lives.12 3 The specified complaint is limited
to the objections enunciated above, but may also include an objection
to: (1) the physician's determination that the patient is in a terminal or
permanently unconscious state; (2) the physician's determination that
the patient is no longer able to make informed decisions regarding the
administration of life-sustaining treatment; or (3) the physician's determination that there is no reasonable possibility that the patient will
regain the capacity to make informed decisions. 2 The failure to file
25
the complaint with the probate court voids the objection.
C. MURTIA (Provisionsfor Individuals who did not Execute a Living Will Document)
The statute also permits a decision by appropriate individuals 2 ' to
consent to the use or continuation, or the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment for an individual who has not executed a living will. A consent decision by an appropriate individual must be made
in good faith and conform to any previously expressed desires by the
nondeclarant regarding treatment in terminally ill or permanently unconscious situations. If no such prior expression of intent exists, then a
consent is generally only valid if it is consistent with the type of informed consent decision that the nondeclarant would have made if she

121.

Id. § 2133.05.

122.

See S. 1 (Preliminary Summary), 119th Ohio Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess., at 4-5 (1991).

123.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

124.

Id.

125.

Id.

§ 2133.05.

126. The order of priority for appropriate consenting individuals is as follows: (I) the
nondeclarant's guardian, (2) spouse, (3) adult child, or children of the nondeclarant, (4) parents
of nondeclarant, (5) adult sibling, or siblings of the nondeclarant, (6) the nearest adult blood
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/24
relative not listed above. Id. § 2133.08.
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had previously expressed her treatment desires, or as inferred from the
declarant's lifestyle and character."
1. Limitations
In connection with a decision to consent to the use or continuation,
or the withholding or withdrawal, of life-sustaining treatment for a
nondeclarant, MURTIA prescribes comfort care and pregnant women
limitations that are similar to those discussed in connection with a declarant.' 81 A similar objection procedure exists for nondeclarants as for
declarants 2 9
2.

Exception (Nutrition-Hydration)

MURTIA specifies one exception with respect to nondeclarants
and the right to continue or refuse life-sustaining treatment. The exception pertains to the withholding or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration." Under circumstances where a nondeclarant has been in a
permanently unconscious state for twelve months or more, the physician can withhold or withdraw nutrition and hydration if all of the following apply: (1) a written consent to the treatment or withdrawal of
such treatment has been given by a priority individual; (2) a probate
court has not reversed the consent via a complaint proceeding; (3) the
attending and consulting physicians can determine to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that comfort care will no longer alleviate
pain; (4) a written consent to the withholding or withdrawing of nutrition and hydration, witnessed by two individuals, is given to the
nondeclarant's attending physician by a priority individual; (5) the latter consent satisfies similar consent requirements found above 3 1 in
nondeclarant standards for the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment; and (6) the probate court issues an order to withhold
or withdraw the nutrition and hydration.1 32

127. Id. § 2133.08. MURTIA has adopted the substituted judgment standard recognized in
the common law doctrine of informed consent. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.,
With respect to standards of evidence, however, MURTIA states that the rules of evidence do not
apply to this section. Id. § 2133.08(D)(3). Therefore, the traditional clear and convincing evidence
standard is moot. The statute leaves courts to their own discretion with respect to which standards
of evidence are applicable under Ohio Revised Code section 2133.08(D).
128. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
129. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.05 (detailed explanation of objection procedures);
see also supra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
130. See S. I (Preliminary Summary), 119th Ohio Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess., at 11 (1991).
131. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
Published132.
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Other General Provisions of MURTIA

MURTIA also provides immunities from criminal prosecution of
certain parties, 133 as well as provisions for transfers of patients who are
unable to receive the proper treatment from certain health care facilities. " " Also included in MURTIA are a reciprocity clause' 3 5 and a
grandfather clause' 36 which allow other living will documents to be ef37
fective under MURTIA if certain conditions are met.'
E.

HC-DPA (Modified Version)

When the Ohio General Assembly enacted MURTIA, it also
amended its 1989 HC-DPA law to conform to the MURTIA provisions. Under the new HC-DPA, no expiration date exists for the decla38
ration unless specified by the principal or patient in the document.
The act also redefines a "terminal condition" and defines a "permanently unconscious state" and "life-sustaining treatment" in a manner
conforming to the definition of those same phrases in MURTIA.139 One
significant change in the new HC-DPA law is that it eliminates the
"imminent" death standard with respect to the provision or nonprovision of nutrition and hydration to the principal.' 4 0 This change makes
the new HC-DPA less restrictive for physicians and health care facilities who had been reluctant to stop nutrition-hydration provisions unless the principal was likely to die in a very short period of time. The
uncertainty of what constitutes "imminent" was eliminated as well.

133. Id. § 2133.11. Those certain parties include the attending physician, the consulting
physician, the health care facility, and health care personnel acting under the direction of the
attending physician. It also includes an individual authorized to give consent or a surrogate decisionmaker. Id. § 2133.11(C)(2).
134. Id. § 2133.10. The transfer provision allows the patient to be moved to another facility
where the provisions of her declaration may be properly followed with respect to health care procedures. Id.
135. Id. § 2133.14. A declaration or living will "executed under the law of another state in
compliance with that law or in substantial compliance with this chapter shall be considered to be
valid for the purposes of this chapter." Id.
136. Id. § 2133.15. MURTIA shall apply to any written document that was executed anywhere prior to the effective date of this statute, that was voluntarily executed by an adult of sound
mind and signed by that adult, and that specifies the adult's intention with respect to the use,
withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment. Id. Such specificity must include,
whether the adult refers to a terminal condition or permanently unconscious state, or both, when
she is no longer able to make informed health care decisions. Id. If these specifics are met, then
the document will be effective as if it had been executed on or after the effective date of MURTIA in accordance with its provisions. Id.
137. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text. The grandfather clause requires that
a living will document meet stricter criteria than those criteria found in the reciprocity clause.
138. Id. § 1337.12. The old HC-DPA had a seven-year expiration date. See also S. 1 (Preliminary Summary), 119th Ohio Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess., at 20 (1991).
139. See S. I (Preliminary Summary) at 20; see also supra note 84.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/24
140. See S. I (Preliminary Summary) at 21.
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The new HC-DPA law amends its revocation provisions and contains a number of other provisions with regard to immunities, reciprocity, and coverage by insurance companies. The new HC-DPA law repeals the capacity requirement with regard to revocation and
subsequently allows a principal to revoke at any time and in any manner."" This revision, however, fails to address those individuals who are
incompetent and may not be able to revoke, irrespective of their wishes.
The new HC-DPA also provides immunities for physicians and other
specified individuals from criminal and civil liability1 42 as well as transfer provisions 43 and notification-objection procedures"4 similar to
those found in MURTIA. The new HC-DPA provides clauses against
prejudice by insurance companies'" as well as reciprocity and grandfather clauses 46 similar to those in the MURTIA provisions.

IV.

ANALYSIS

MURTIA is a substantive, progressive response to the inconsistencies and unsettled case law surrounding health care law in Ohio. 14 It is
not, however, without criticism." 8 This section explores the factors
prompting the passage of MURTIA and discusses its strengths and
weaknesses with respect to Ohio health care law. This section also provides possible solutions to the problems facing MURTIA.
Three basic factors prompted the Ohio General Assembly to enact
MURTIA. These factors included: (1) the growing involvement of
courts in the health care decisionmaking process; (2) the Couture decision; and (3) Ohio voters' concerns, particularly from the elderly community, over the lack of statutory guidance in health care law." 9 Senator Richard H. Finan, a sponsor of MURTIA, stated that "leading
cases such as Cruzan, combined with the increased involvement in
health care decisionmaking by state courts across the nation, made the

141.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.14.

142. Id. § 1337.15; see also supra note 133 and accompanying text.
143. Id. § 1337.16; see also supra note 134.
144. Id.; see also supra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
145. Id. This provision prohibits any entity engaged in the insurance business from requiring an individual to create or refrain from creating a living will, or revoke or refrain from revoking
an existing living will.
146. Id.; see also supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Kapp, supra note 4; Jones, supra note 70; Mullins, supra note 36; Couture v.
Couture, 549 N.E.2d 571 (vague inconsistencies inherent in the 1989 HC-DPA law illustrated by
court's seemingly illogical holding); see supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 157-173 and accompanying text.
149. Telephone interview with Senator Richard H. Finan, sponsor of MURTIA (Oct. 3,
1991). Senator Finan stated these factors were instrumental in the passage of living will
legislation.
Published
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passage of living will legislation an essential priority." ' According to
Senator Finan, many Ohio voters had asked why Ohio was without a
living will law. 151 MURTIA was a response to these concerns. The
Couture decision "basically killed" the 1989 HC-DPA law according to
Senator Finan.' 52 The Ohio General Assembly responded by modifying
the 1989 HC-DPA law and by conforming it to the provisions of
MURTIA.
Another "impetus for the creation of Ohio's living will legislation
is the gap which exists in common law."'153 The Ohio General Assembly heard a number of diverse viewpoints when it was dealing with issues as sensitive as life and death.' 54 One drafter of the statute regarded its provisions as "a product of compromises necessary to achieve
consensus on the enactment of this legislation."' 55 Herein lies the major
weakness of MURTIA. It is a confusing piece of legislation with so
many safeguards, exceptions, and compromises that it will invite confusion and litigation. One critic called it " 'a 77-page monstrosity' loaded
with so many exceptions 'only God will understand the bill.'""" Although such a comment is exaggerated, it does illustrate the major infirmities associated with MURTIA.
MURTIA is a compromise of competing social and ethical viewpoints.' 5 7 As a result, many of the provisions in the statute are confusing and inadequate. One of the major difficulties associated with the
statute is its objection provisions. 15 Senator Finan explained that the
General Assembly felt significant safeguards were necessary to ensure

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., William M. Todd, Directing Health-Care Choices, OHIO LAWYER, September/October 1991, at 11. William Todd is a partner at the law firm of Porter, Wright, Morris &
Arthur and one of the primary drafters of MURTIA. See also supra notes 9-62 and accompanying text.
154. Some varying interests included, the Catholic Conference of Ohio, Ohio's Right to Life
Society, the Ohio Medical Association, and the Ohio Bar Association. Telephone Interview with
Sen. Richard H. Finan, sponsor of MURTIA (Oct. 3, 1991). Right to life advocates expressed
concern that the statute might lack enough safeguards and consequently allow too many improper
deaths to occur. Id. The Catholic Conference of Ohio, on the other hand, felt the time had come
to deal with living will legislation. Id.
Some of the Ohio Medical Association's concerns revolved around professional liability and
the effect MURTIA would have on the ability of health care professionals to adequately service
the needs of MURTIA-type patients. Id. The Ohio Bar Association's concerns generally focused
on the structure of the statute and how effective and easily applicable it would be in practice. Id.
155. See, e.g., Todd, supra note 153, at 10.
156. Jim Bland, Living-Will Law Called Death Warrantfor Some, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 30, 1991, at IA, 6A (quoting C. Terry Johnson, attorney at Porter, Wright, Morris &
Arthur and drafter of the legislation).
157. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/24

19921

OHIO'S LIVING WILL

1113

proper treatment decisions were made.' 59 The result is a three-way
decisionmaking proxy which includes the patient's doctor(s), family
members, and the courts. Since both MURTIA and HC-DPA require
that certain family members receive notice1 60 when a physician makes
a medical decision regarding the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from the patient, objection provisions are available to be exercised in any given case.
Although limitations"" exist on the types of objections that can be
filed with the probate court, it is conceivable that a patient's treatment
preferences, no matter how clearly expressed in a living will, may nevertheless be delayed or even supplanted by objections from family
members. Arguments can be easily made charging that a patient was
under duress, subjected to undue influence, or of unsound mind' 6 2 when
he executed a living will. It is also possible, however, that without such
notification safeguards, a patient's wishes and treatment may fall to the
sole discretion of an attending physician who may disregard patient
wishes due to MURTIA immunity clauses. Although MURTIA provides immunity clauses for physicians, in order to avoid liability under
such clauses- physicians are required to meet standards of: (1) "good
faith;" (2) "reasonable degree of medical certainty" when making decisions; and (3) must make treatment decisions "in accordance with reasonable medical standards. 16 3 Therefore, physician conduct is properly
safeguarded by the provisions of the immunity clauses.
The General Assembly could have better framed the objection provisions to include an optional notification-objection provision. Under
this optional notification-objection provision, a patient would choose
whether she wants certain family members to receive notice of her
treatment decisions for the sole purpose of objecting to those treatment
decisions. The objection would be limited to those specific types already
outlined in MURTIA.' 64 This optional notification-objection procedure
would eliminate the automatic triggering of the objection provision,
and thereby avoid the likelihood or possibility of additional unreasonable litigation by family members. The Ohio General Assembly seems to
allude to this type of optional notification-objection provision in section
2133.02 of the Ohio Revised Code, but later requires physicians to no-

159. Telephone Interview with Senator Richard H. Finan, sponsor of MURTIA (Oct. 3,
1991).
160. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.05(A)(2)(a)(ii), 1337.16(D)(1)(b); see also supra
notes 119-125 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., S. I (Preliminary Summary), 119th Ohio Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess., at 4-5.
(1991); see also supra note 122.
163. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.11(A)(5) and 2133.11(B).
See supra note
122 and accompanying text.
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by eCommons,
1991

1114

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17:3

tify specified family members irrespective of the patient's notification
wishes. 16 5
Since the immunity clauses set out in sections 2133.11(A)(5) and
2133.11(B) of MURTIA hold physicians to "reasonable medical standards" and a "reasonable medical certainty" when making treatment
decisions for MURTIA patients, these immunity clauses actually serve
as safeguards to ensure proper medical practice and conduct by physicians. As a result, notice provisions for the sole purpose of an objection
should be at the discretion of the patient rather than mandatory, since
the conduct of physicians is adequately safeguarded by the standards of
conduct that they must adhere to in the immunity clauses.' 66 Of course,
notification provisions for the purpose of allowing family members an
opportunity to visit with a patient before life-sustaining treatment is
withdrawn, should automatically be required.
Additionally, there seems to be a statutory language construction
problem in the reciprocity and grandfather clauses of MURTIA. The
grandfather clause encompasses:
any written document that was executed anywhere .. .and that specifies the adult's intention with respect to the use, continuation, withdrawal, or withholding of life-sustaining treatment if he is at any time in
a terminal condition or permanently unconscious state, or both, and is no
longer able to make informed decisions regarding health care decisions,
nor will he ever gain the capacity to do so again.' 6 7
Ohio's grandfather clause will thus accept any document from presumably any state as long as the document comports with the specific provisions and standards enunciated in Ohio's MURTIA.6 8 MURTIA
clearly requires that its specific provisional standards be met by any
document attempting to use the grandfather clause.' 69
On the other hand, MURTIA's reciprocity clause will accept "a
declaration executed under the law of another state in compliance with
that law or in substantial compliance with this chapter . . . .,,'1o The
reciprocity clause will allow any document from any state to comply
either with the law of another state, presumably the one in which the
document was drafted, or comply with the law and provisions of Ohio's
MURTIA.1 71 While MURTIA's grandfather clause allows a living will
document from another state to comport only with the provisions of
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.05(A)(2)(a)(ii).
See id.§§ 2133.11(A)(5) and 2133.11(B).
Id. § 2133.15(A).
Id. § 2133.15.
Id.
i70. Id. § 2133.14 (emphasis added).
171. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/24
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
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MURTIA for it to be effective in Ohio, the reciprocity clause in MURTIA allows a living will document to be effective in Ohio if it comports
with either Ohio's MURTIA provisions or another state's statutory living will provisions. Therefore, the statutory language of section 21,33.14
is inconsistent with the statutory language found in section 2133.15 of
the Ohio Revised Code.
The revocation provisions in MURTIA allow a patient to revoke
his living will "at any time and in any manner. ' '172 This standard replaces the 1989 HC-DPA revocation provision which presumed a patient's capacity to revoke "unless there is evidence to the contrary. ' 173
While MURTIA avoids the problem of defining the nature or weight of
evidence necessary to rebut the presumed capacity assumption, it fails
to address those incompetent individuals who may not be capable of
revoking, irrespective of their wishes. Unless such an incompetent patient regains the competency to revoke, that patient's treatment will
consist of what is stated in his living will. The Ohio General Assembly
may want to amend this revocation section and allow family members,
health care personnel, and other witnesses an opportunity to provide
evidence of an incompetent patient's intention to revoke, although no
actual revocation occurred. If the Ohio General Assembly were to
adopt such a measure, it should also establish and require a clear and
convincing evidence standard of the patient's intent to revoke before
any such revocation occurs. This strict evidentiary standard is necessary to ensure that the wishes of the patient are followed to the highest
degree of certainty possible.
While the aforementioned weaknesses in MURTIA may cause
some litigation, the statute is preferable to the inconsistencies which
plague common law health care concepts. The weaknesses in MURTIA
can be corrected. The objection procedure is too cumbersome and will
lead to excessive litigation among family members, health care providers, and probate courts. The General Assembly should amend the objection provisions to include an optional rather than mandatory notification-objection provision for the patient. The patient may then control
which family members, if any, have the right to file an objection. For
example, if a patient chooses not to exercise the notice option, then no
family members are notified and the forty-eight hour objection provision is not triggered. In other words, the ability to use the forty-eight
hour objection procedure is contingent upon receiving notice.
The immunity provisions allow physicians to avoid liability only if
their decisions are made in "good faith," with "reasonable medical cer-

172. Id.§§ 1337.14, 2133.04.
Published by
1991 see also Kapp,
173.eCommons,
Id. § 1337.14(A);
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tainty," and "in accordance with reasonable medical standards. '174
These standards provide adequate safeguards against medical malpractice and misconduct. Additionally, such standards further enhance the
idea of an optional notification-objection provision. With the immunity
clauses holding physicians' treatment decisions to standards of "good
faith," "reasonable medical certainty," and "in accordance with reasonable medical standards," there is no need for access to a mandatory
objection procedure by family members. An optional notification-objection provision would be more appropriate under the existing provisions
of MURTIA.
MURTIA provides a transfer provision that allows the patient an
opportunity to be transferred to another health care facility in the
event that her current facility cannot or does not want to follow the
treatment decisions set out in her living will or enunciated by a surrogate decisionmaker 1 7 1 This type of transfer option will lead to excessive health care costs. The General Assembly should mandate that all
health care facilities adhere to any properly executed living will directives. If certain facilities, for some extraordinary or legitimate reason
as determined by the court, cannot adhere to living will directives, then
such facilities must give notice to the public that such a restriction exists in its policies. Therefore, patients will know in advance where living
will directives are accepted.
The contradictory language in the reciprocity and grandfather
clauses is an easy problem to remedy. The General Assembly should
delete the phrase, "in compliance with that law . . .,"176 thus requiring
any reciprocal living will document to conform to the specific standards
of Ohio law. Such an amendment would make the language in MURTIA more uniform and consistent and also make the language used in
all Ohio living will documents consistent with the MURTIA provisions.
Finally, the Ohio General Assembly should allow family members,
health care personnel, and other witnesses an opportunity to provide
evidence of an incompetent patient's intention and desire to revoke his
living will document under the MURTIA revocation provisions. A requirement of clear and convincing evidence should apply in situations
where courts must make a determination of whether a patient intended
to revoke his declaration, even though no such revocation actually
occurred.
MURTIA provides statutory guidelines for the decisionmaking
process of all Ohio health care patients. There are some inherent

174. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.11 (A)(5) and 2133.11(B).
175. See id. § 2133.11.
176. Id. § 2133.14; see also supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/24
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problems, however, in MURTIA. The most notable of these problems
is its objection provisions. In order for MURTIA to function as an effective statutory guideline for Ohio health care patients, the General
Assembly needs to amend the objection provision to allow for an optional notification-objection provision.
The optional notification-objection provision gives health care patients a choice of whether they wish to have any family member or
other individual notified before treatment decisions are pursued. This
type of amendment is essential because it guarantees the avoidance of
additional litigation by possibly unreasonable family members or other
individuals. At the very least, the Ohio General Assembly should consider amending the existing mandatory objection provisions in order to
provide for a more effective and consistent set of statutory guidelines
for Ohio health care patients.
V.

CONCLUSION

The enactment of MURTIA begins a new era of health care law
in Ohio. The litany of problems in this area of the law have illustrated
the need for statutory guidance to help courts better address the difficult decisions inherent in topics such as the right to die, the right to
self-determination, and the right to forego medical treatment. Decisions
such as Couture v. Couture and the Leach cases further accentuate the
Ohio courts' troubles in dealing with this very sensitive subject area.
Ohio's MURTIA addresses these troubles and paves the way for a
more consistent body of case law in the future. The difficulties inherent
in MURTIA can be remedied. Given some time, amendments, and
subsequent case law, MURTIA will effectively fill the gaps left by
common law health care history. "Perhaps no one will be content with
all of the provisions of [MURTIA]. But these are not easy issues, and
in many cases there are no clear-cut answers." 1'77 MURTIA provides a
foundation on which a uniform system of health care law can be built.
Richard J. Casey

See, e.g., Health-Care
Choices, supra note
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